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From Bench to Dock: 
Putting Judges on Trial 
 
Leonidas K. Cheliotis1 
 
 
Historian and civil rights activist Howard Zinn (1994) has famously argued 
that ‘you can’t be neutral on a moving train’. When events are moving in 
perilous directions, to avoid taking sides in the name of neutrality is 
tantamount to resignation. American criminal justice has long been on a 
treacherous route, if it has not already ‘run off the rails’ and ‘collapsed’ 
(Stuntz, 2011: 5). This is perhaps most evident in the emergence of what has 
come to be called ‘mass incarceration’; that is, the excessive overuse of 
imprisonment and the rapid spread of serious human rights violations inside 
the country’s prisons over the last four decades or so.  
Jonathan Simon, one the foremost penologists worldwide, has been 
anything but neutral in his reaction. Mass Incarceration on Trial is part of a 
long series of high-profile publications through which Simon has sought to 
help reverse the course of the US penal system, not only exposing its grave 
injustices and deeply harmful consequences thus far, but also proposing 
concrete ways to radically alter it in the immediate or near future. Elegantly 
written and passionately argued, Mass Incarceration on Trial grapples with 
mass incarceration through a painstaking examination of a series of court 
challenges to prison conditions in California, culminating in the Supreme 
Court’s landmark 2011 decision in Brown v. Plata to declare conditions in 
California prisons unconstitutional and impose a population cap on the state 
prison system. As well as demonstrating how the judiciary can function as a 
motor of fundamental penal reform from within the American criminal justice 
system itself, the book distills the lessons that can be learnt for penal reform 
activism more broadly, thereby inspiring hope that large-scale progressive 
change is truly possible. In what follows, I elaborate on some of the book’s 
major strengths, whilst also raising two interrelated issues: first, the degree to 
which reliance on the concept of dignity as a guiding principle of 
constitutional law can promote grassroots change in penal matters; and 
second, the conditions under which American judges may be more likely to 
put their decision-making powers at the service of such change. 
Mass Incarceration on Trial suggests that an essential but heretofore 
underused tool for furthering fundamentally progressive penal reform in the 
US today is invocation of the notion of dignity; a notion that has in recent 
years become increasingly influential as a constitutional value within the 
American legal system as a whole, and one that largely formed the basis of the 
majority opinion in Brown v. Plata. According to Simon, a powerful lesson we 
can –indeed, should– learn from the US experiment with mass incarceration 
is that ‘human dignity and public safety go together; one cannot flourish 
without the other’ (Simon, 2014: 9). Simon’s argument is that protecting 	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human dignity, whether in the sense of diverting lawbreakers away from 
prison or eliminating cruel, unusual and inhumane punishment for those put 
behind bars, has two distinct but interrelated advantages. It is the key not only 
to protecting lawbreakers’ own safety (e.g., by eschewing their exposure to 
deeply unhealthy custodial conditions), but also to pre-empting or arresting 
the criminogenic effects of imprisonment that put public safety at risk. To the 
extent that progressive criminal justice reforms enacted in the 1960s through 
judicial decisions based on the notion of dignity (e.g., enhanced rights for 
criminal defendants under the Fifth Amendment, and the protection of 
prisoners’ rights under the Eighth Amendment) proved short-lived because 
they appeared to underplay or otherwise ignore crime control concerns, the 
challenge today is to highlight and establish confidence in the consequential 
utility of human dignity as a means to public safety.  
Simon recognises that prison reform litigation based on dignity cannot 
alone correct the social injustices underlying and reproduced through mass 
incarceration. But he also argues persuasively that this awareness must 
inform, as opposed to discouraging, any effort to claim human rights for the 
victims of mass incarceration. Even though litigation cannot be an effective 
vehicle for promoting substantive policy change unless other political and 
social forces are also poised to move in this direction, Simon remains firmly 
committed to a measured optimism about the power of litigation ‘to open 
small but potentially critical ruptures in the naturalness of legal order and 
social hierarchy’ (Simon, 1992: 940; see also Feeley & Rubin, 1998).  
The very concept of human dignity is open to various uses, however, 
not least because it eludes precise definition. To this extent, the combination 
of human dignity and public safety can assume different forms than the one 
envisaged in Mass Incarceration on Trial. Indeed, the right to dignity is not 
necessarily antithetical to, and may in fact come to serve, institutional and 
other forms of violence committed in the name of the right to public safety. A 
good example of this can be found in Justice Antonin Scalia’s concurring 
opinion in McDonald vs. City of Chicago (2010), a landmark case where the 
US Supreme Court struck down a gun ban and extended the right to ‘keep and 
bear arms’ to fifty states.  
For Scalia, a staunch gun-rights advocate who has gone so far as to 
suggest that Americans may have a constitutional right to own and carry 
shoulder-mounted anti-aircraft missiles, the right to keep and bear arms 
amounts not only to a matter of safety in the sense of enhancing self-defence 
against criminal threats, but also at least in part to a matter of dignity. Scalia, 
in other words, appears to offer a reversal of the logic espoused by Simon. At 
the same time as conceptualising dignity merely by reference to ‘law-abiding 
members of the community’, Scalia renders their dignity as an end-goal and 
their safety as a means of achieving it (never mind ample solid evidence from 
the US and elsewhere that higher gun ownership rates result in higher rates of 
deaths from firearms). Unsurprisingly, Scalia dissented in Brown v. Plata, 
calling ‘outrageous’ the prospect of 46,000 prisoners being released under 
court order insofar as public safety would be jeopardised as a result (Simon, 
2014: 152). Although the Brown majority chose to take steps to protect 
prisoners’ dignity whilst concurrently affirming that imprisonment is not a 
necessary or sufficient condition of public safety, this surely is not a guarantee 
that Scalia’s own formula of dignity and safety will not prevail in future cases.  
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The point here is not just that the elasticity of the concept of dignity 
implies it can be interpreted and applied in multiple and contradictory ways, 
including in ways that stand in contrast with progressive aspirations. As 
Jeffrey Rosen (2015) comments in a recent article he published in The 
Atlantic, the deeper problem with placing one’s hopes for progressive policy 
change in judicial invocation of dignity as a guiding principle of constitutional 
law lies in ‘empowering judges to decide whose dignity trumps when the 
interests of citizens with very different conceptions of dignity clash’. Other 
things being equal, it appears questionable whether usage of the language of 
dignity will provoke the same body of judges who have long contributed so 
decisively to the rise of mass incarceration with their punitive decision-
making under the banner of public safety to revert their modus operandi and 
start pursuing decarceration in order to protect lawbreakers’ dignitary rights.2 
Even if dignity continues to play a role in prison reform litigation from now 
on, this may well be in the form of public dignity as entangled with public 
safety; a version of dignity that does not only fail to extend to lawbreakers, but 
is also practically defined in opposition to their own basic human rights.  
One can, of course, trace examples of conservative punitive judges who 
transformed themselves into liberal advocates of the rights of prisoners and 
other disadvantaged groups in society. Such change, however, is uncommon 
and tends to stem from highly idiosyncratic factors, which implies it may not 
be relied upon as a means of galvanising or otherwise supporting grassroots 
institutional reforms. It may be, on the other hand, that by delving into 
trajectories of personal transformation one can discover important clues as to 
how to trigger large-scale liberalising effects on established patterns of judicial 
decision-making through cultivating cultural changes within and across the 
judiciary as a whole.  
In this vein, the metamorphosis of Earl Warren, one of America’s most 
influential Supreme Court justices, might lend itself as an instructive case in 
point. The overwhelming majority of people associate Warren with his tenure 
as Chief Justice between 1953 and 1969, when he played a crucial role in the 
expansion of civil rights and personal liberties in the US. Not everyone 
considers Warren and his court to have been ‘radically activist’ in terms of 
aspirations, or, in any case, to have succeeded in promoting far-reaching 
changes in policy and practice (see, e.g., Stuntz, 2011; Scheiber, 2006; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The escalation of strict sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing laws 
from the 1980s onwards is often said to lie behind the rise of mass incarceration in the US by 
having stifled the discretion of judges and forced them into making ever-greater use of long 
custodial sentences (see, e.g., Murakawa, 2014: 115-119). The rise of mass incarceration, 
however, was already under way when sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums 
began proliferating. At least as concerns the consequences specifically of sentencing 
guidelines for judicial practice, moreover, it has been argued that whilst judges could have 
exercised a significant degree of discretion and even given rise to a ‘common law of 
sentencing’, in good part because guidelines have often been incomplete and vague, they have 
instead proceeded to enforce guidelines with a rigour that was not at all required formally 
(Gertner, 2007; see also Ulmer, 2005). Although judicial discretion has formally increased 
since 2005, when the Supreme Court declared in Booker v. United States that federal 
sentencing guidelines are merely of an advisory nature, prison rates over the same period 
have only declined modestly in most states, and have continued rising unabated in several 
others (The Sentencing Project, 2015). Indeed, the majority of federal judges are still 
supportive of, and practically adhere to, federal sentencing guidelines (Rakoff, 2015; Osler & 
Bennett, 2014). 
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Rosenberg, 1991). Warren nevertheless reached progressive rulings in a range 
of landmark cases, from Brown v. Board of Education (which ordered school 
desegregation), to Gideon v. Wainwright (which secured provision of counsel 
to indigent criminal defendants), to Mapp v. Ohio (which made available the 
exclusionary remedy for police abuse of Fourth Amendment rights), to 
Miranda v. Arizona (which sought to protect the constitutional rights of 
suspects in custody), to name but a few.  
What usually goes unnoticed is Warren’s prior service as Attorney 
General of California during the Second World War, when he gave his 
approval for what Simon (2014: 171) describes as a profound aberration from 
democracy; that is, the evacuation and indefinite internment of tens of 
thousands of innocent Japanese-Americans. For present purposes, the 
important point here is that Warren’s liberalism as Chief Justice is said to 
have been at least in part the outcome of feeling personally guilty for his 
illiberalism as California’s Attorney General (see, e.g., Reeves, 2015). If so, 
could it be perhaps that the key to liberalising judicial practice today is 
attaching shame to excessively punitive decision-making patterns, thereby 
also instilling guilt into those judges whose decisions have actively contributed 
to the rise of mass incarceration thus far? Mass Incarceration on Trial does 
not make direct reference to Warren, except to note that the majority opinion 
he wrote in Trop v. Dulles, a lesser known but still important case where a 
specific noncapital sentence was found to be unconstitutional, broke new 
ground by introducing the language of dignity into Supreme Court litigation 
for the first time. Warren’s trajectory still lends support to Simon’s suggestion 
that penal reform in the US today ‘must begin with remorse for a record of 
human rights violations that went on for decades’ (Simon, 2014: 168).  
Simon’s primary concern here is not with the judiciary, but rather with 
‘those officials who led us into mass incarceration, those who planned and 
operated prisons they knew would deny prisoners basic human rights such as 
healthcare’ (Simon, 2014: 169). In Mass Incarceration on Trial, judges are in 
fact mostly sitting on the bench, rather than in the dock, their role extending 
to castigating state authorities for their enthusiastic endorsement of 
excessively punitive policies, thereby hopefully helping to form and spread a 
new, humanitarian ‘common sense’ about prisons, prisoners and crime 
prevention. Indeed, Simon explicitly credits the majority in Brown v. Plata 
with having already achieved the ‘judicial shaming’ of California’s prolonged 
tolerance of inhumane prison conditions (Simon, 2014: 155). But just as 
courts can –and do– contribute to shaping broader discourses, so too broader 
discourses can be applied to assess and influence courts themselves. More to 
the point, unless one presumes that the judiciary bears no responsibility for 
the rise of mass incarceration or that it has somehow undergone liberalisation 
already, there is no reason why judges should be exempted from the shaming 
they can perform on others. Are judges not those who sent hundreds of 
thousands of people to prisons they knew would deny prisoners basic human 
rights? 
The argument in Mass Incarceration on Trial is that the judiciary has 
grown increasingly affected by a ‘humanitarian anxiety’ regarding the effects 
of mass incarceration; namely, ‘revulsion at current practices and a 
motivation to reform them in the name of decency’ (Simon, 2014: 150). 
Crucially, humanitarian anxiety itself is said to have been triggered amongst 
judges through their exposure to photographic images of prisoners’ suffering, 
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including notably the images appended by Justice Kennedy to his majority 
opinion in Brown v. Plata (which also apparently brought Justice Kennedy 
himself into the majority, contrary to his past record as an active supporter of 
harsh imprisonment). The underlying premise here is that knowledge of the 
suffering of others carries an intrinsic resolutory potential, bound as it is to 
animate the universal human capacity for empathy and a sense of moral 
obligation to intervene remedially. It is implied that, if judges previously failed 
to take action against mass incarceration and its effects, it is because the 
suffering of prisoners remained beneath their notice (Simon, 2014: 150).  
Prison conditions and prisoners’ suffering, however, have not been 
inconspicuous. If anything –and this, admittedly, is a point I have missed in 
my own previous work–, the mass media in the US have long afforded a 
significant degree of visual access inside the country’s prisons (e.g., not least 
through television documentary series such as A&E’s Investigative Reports 
and History Channel’s Big House), directly or indirectly positioning spectators 
as witnesses to prisoners’ pain. It may be true that not all media 
representations of prisons and their prisoners aim or manage to confront 
spectators with responsibility to act on prisoners’ misfortune; conservative 
cues, for example, may legitimate harsh prison conditions in the sense of just 
retribution or public protection against dangerous offenders, real or 
constructed (see further Brown, 2009). Yet the reason behind inaction against 
mass incarceration cannot be purely ignorance about its nature and 
consequences. As members of society, American judges have been just as 
likely as the rest of the nation to be exposed to mass-mediated images of 
prisoners’ plight, and thereby to have at least an idea of what goes on behind 
prison walls in the country, not to mention that the judiciary has also had 
additional access to damning information about custodial conditions through 
ever-increasing flows of prison reform litigation, already amounting to 20 
percent of the entire federal court docket by 1995 (see further Schlanger, 
2003; Guetzkow and Schoon, 2015). If, as Simon argues, judges ‘are probably 
the most important audience [prisoners’ suffering] could reach’, insofar as 
‘they are the institution most accessible to the excluded and the outcast’ 
(Simon, 2014: 150), then the question of their reaction becomes all the more 
significant.  
Were one to address judicial behaviour solely in terms of ‘reaction’, 
however, one would miss what is arguably the most important point. At stake 
for other audiences is long-standing tolerance and even consensual support 
for the more or less visible suffering of prisoners. The issue in the case of 
judges is not so much their passivity or their reluctant and inadequate 
responses towards the known harmful consequences of mass incarceration, as 
it is their excessive use of custodial sentences as a form of knowing active 
imposition of harm on lawbreakers in the first instance. Once due recognition 
is paid to the fact that judges’ role in the rise of mass incarceration has first 
and foremost been proactive, if also encouraged by various other groups (e.g., 
political elites, citizen constituencies and trade unions), then it is all the more 
clear that judicial behaviour needs to be examined by reference to the ways in 
which judges justify their actions (and inactions) to themselves. The most 
likely candidate here is a belief in long custodial punishment under harsh 
conditions as a means of avenging crime and incapacitating purportedly 
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incorrigible criminal populations that would otherwise undermine public 
safety.3 
This brings us to a further point. In and of itself, knowledge of the 
suffering of prisoners is an important but insufficient condition for the 
emergence of ‘humanitarian anxiety’, be it amongst judges or anyone else. 
Although the empathic emotions that are necessary to induce a sense of 
responsibility for remedial action cannot be animated when the pain of others 
remains in obscurity, there is no guarantee that empathy will actually be 
called forth as soon as the pain of others comes to the surface. Humans do 
have a natural capacity for empathy, but the expression of empathy is a matter 
of culture and the politics that shape it. To put the point differently: whether 
or not empathy is shown to suffering others is largely dependent on the 
culture that defines the meaning that those others and their condition have for 
us.  
According to research on responses to violence, a crucial precondition 
of empathy is that sufferers are deemed worthy of empathic reaction, and that 
failure to react empathically to their predicament is considered to be 
discordant with dominant moral principles. Conversely, if sufferers carry 
individual or collective labels that dress their plight in the clothes of 
deservedness and necessity, empathy towards them is unlikely to emerge; 
here exhibition of empathy may in fact be prohibited by the moral strictures of 
the day. Stereotypes that justify the imposition of pain on others and prevent 
empathic intervention to remedy their misfortune may be durable even 
against direct, physical visibility of the misfortune at issue, and this regardless 
of whether or how one may be related to victims (e.g., through kith or kin; see 
further Cheliotis, 2010). This being the case, to borrow the words of 
Norwegian philosopher Arne Johan Vetlesen when he writes about the context 
in which the Holocaust was performed, mass incarceration and the role of 
judges in its rise and persistence have to be understood as a situation ‘where 
the victim is not lost from view, but instead remains a focus–a focus whose 
significance is nothing else than that of lending the evil to take place its 
quality as something legitimate (required, necessary) to do’ (Vetlesen, 2005: 
27, original emphasis).  
This point essentially supports Simon’s call for anchoring penal reform 
in the US today to remorse for the long record of human rights violations in 
the country’s prisons. It also affirms Simon’s insistence that a new discourse 
about prisoners, prisons and crime prevention also needs to develop and 
spread across the US: a discourse where prisoners are fully included in the 
category of human personhood and are no longer labeled as homogeneously 
and irredeemably dangerous; a discourse where recognition is paid to the dual 
need for reducing the use of imprisonment and humanising custodial 
conditions; a discourse, finally, that calls for the decriminalisation of 
innocuous behaviours and shifts the focus of crime prevention towards 
regulation of the routine activities and situations in which crimes tend to 
occur. Indeed, much of what Simon includes in this alternative discourse is 
requisite for generating the sense of remorse he deems necessary. Once, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 That this may be the discourse commonly communicated by conservative media and widely 
shared by political elites, state officials, prison administrators and large segments of the 
public, is not to say that judicial attitudes and practices are necessarily deferential to external 
pressures.  
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example, the label of generic and invariable dangerousness is successfully 
detached from prisoners, and once it is firmly established that a great many 
offenders suffer cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in prisons for crimes 
that could have been dealt with less painfully, less expensively and more 
effectively through community-based schemes, then support for mass 
incarceration can turn into an object of shame.  
But if, as I have argued above, it is important that the judiciary not be 
exempt from such shaming, then judges may be an uncertain source for the 
new common sense that shaming, theirs or others’, requires. Penological 
scholarship can step in and provide essential input to the production of the 
humanitarian discourse Simon envisages. True, penology has not been 
entirely immune to responsibility for the ‘old common sense’ that encouraged 
undue fear of criminal victimisation, invented classes of criminally-prone 
people and called for their punitive incapacitation. On the other hand, by 
virtue of its empirical and normative expertise, together with its strong critical 
caucus, penology is well placed for the task at hand. Indeed, Mass 
Incarceration on Trial abundantly attests to this.  
As well as offering a clear and comprehensive evidence-based picture of 
the brutal nature of US prisons, the book explains in meticulous detail why its 
findings should be cause for grave moral concern, over and above issues of 
unconstitutionality. That the reader is exposed both to the grim realities of 
American imprisonment and to powerful arguments as to the various ways in 
which the realities in question are morally reprehensible, is of essential 
importance from the point of view of promoting change. Considered alone, 
cruel conditions of imprisonment cannot generate emotional disquiet and 
soul-searching, let alone support for substantive reform, amongst people who 
remain unchallenged in their belief that such conditions are justifiable. 
Conversely, unless grounded in thorough accounts of life inside prisons, moral 
critiques of imprisonment are bound to be denied as irrelevant and 
sensationalist, especially amongst prison enthusiasts. But Mass Incarceration 
on Trial does not stop there. It rather adds further impetus to the case for 
grassroots penal reform and decarceration in particular by paying recognition 
and responding with convincing empirical evidence to ‘realist’ criminological 
concerns about how to deal with the realities of crime, including recidivism; 
issues that critical criminologists are not always comfortable to acknowledge 
and debate.  
Although it is a cliché to say about books one deems important for 
human welfare that they should be read by everyone, Mass Incarceration on 
Trial fully deserves this accolade. It is perhaps most imperative, however, that 
the book be read by American judges, so as to encourage urgent change 
amongst this strategically positioned body of professionals. If anything –and 
this is another significant contribution of Mass Incarceration on Trial–, 
Simon’s focus on Brown v. Plata and other recent landmark court decisions 
about prison conditions in the US illustrates that a different, progressive 
course is truly possible in judicial practice. At the same time, the book’s 
readership should ideally extend beyond the US borders, not least because the 
American example of excessive punitiveness has inspired or otherwise 
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